What we’ve learned: 7 shocking insights from the October 7 reports – Ynetnews

Following the IDF’s investigation into the failures leading up to and during Hamas’ October 7 massacre, new intelligence has surfaced, including Hamas’ plan to kill 600 people in the southern city of Ofakim.

Raad Saad, the first Hamas operations commander Israel tried to assassinate during the war, devised the plan to infiltrate Israel above ground—bypassing tunnels after Israel constructed an underground barrier. Based on his strategy, elite Nukhba battalions were formed, each with a designated reserve force.

Intelligence gathered during Israel’s military offensive in Gaza last year provided a trove of new details. The attack plan, originally formulated in 2017, included live-streaming the incursions into border communities and IDF positions, the use of deception tactics and the takeover of key symbolic and strategic sites such as police stations. Hamas also aimed to reach major southern cities, including Be’er Sheva, Ashdod and Ashkelon.

The plan for Ofakim called for the murder of at least 600 civilians, but during the actual attack, 33 city residents were killed.

A review of intelligence indicated that Hamas’ decision to launch the October 7 attack was unrelated to anti-government protests in Israel over judicial reform. Israeli intelligence had missed two earlier planned attack dates—one during the previous government and another during Passover in 2023. The latter was reportedly postponed after IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi attended a Seder meal with troops at a base near the border and stayed overnight.

According to intelligence analysts, Hamas twice delayed its planned massacre at the last moment to further strengthen its forces. “Hamas realized they were only 85% ready by the end of 2022 and parts of 2023,” the military intelligence probe found. “In one operative’s file, we discovered a record of the original attack date. For Hamas, 2022 was considered a year of great opportunities.”

The IDF’s Military Intelligence Research Department, responsible for issuing strategic war alerts, failed to detect at least 10 warning signs in the two years preceding the attack. One major misinterpretation involved a Hamas-produced television series that depicted scenarios later carried out in the October 7 massacre.

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, who was later killed in a clash with Israeli forces, had praised the program, which illustrated how the terror group intended to infiltrate Israel.

Israel had prepared for a worst-case scenario involving an invasion of 70 terrorists from four to eight locations. The IDF activated its response plan just nine minutes after the attack began. However, in reality, Hamas launched the assault with 1,175 terrorists, while only 671 IDF soldiers were available to respond.

The military’s command bunker, activated soon after the assault began, was aware of only 55% of what was happening on the ground. This lack of accurate intelligence led to confusion, while the Gaza Division collapsed under the scale of the attack.

According to the military probe, the first drone strike occurred at 7:15 a.m., preventing terrorists from entering Netiv HaAsara. At 7:55 a.m., the first fighter jet targeted a tunnel near the border to stop further infiltration. By 8:02 a.m., a helicopter gunship engaged terrorists near Kibbutz Re’im, and by 8:10 a.m., helicopters had begun evacuating the wounded. At 8:47 a.m., special forces were flown in to reinforce troops along the border and inside attacked communities.

Despite these efforts, Hamas’ assault had been in motion since midday Friday, with extensive preparations going undetected by the IDF and Shin Bet. The terrorists struck in three waves, deploying 5,500 armed men who carried out mass killings, rapes and abductions.