IDF’s social media posts helped Hamas invade Nahal Oz base, October 7 probe reveals – The Jerusalem Post

IDF soldiers left so many markers on social media that Hamas invaders on October 7 had a complete breakdown of nearly every unit, sub-unit, and building within the Nahal Oz IDF base when they overwhelmed it, killed 53 soldiers, and took 10 hostage on October 7, 2023.

16 of those killed were female field observers, many killed when Hamas burned the building they were in, and several of the hostages were among the recently released female hostages as part of the January 19 ceasefire. Two officers and five soldiers did escape the burning situation room by breaking a bathroom window and sneaking out.

So complete were the social media descriptions, often simply from photos that soldiers snapped next to different buildings on their first or last day in a position, that the IDF official probe of the battle has concluded that Hamas did not need a single spy to pull off its highly specific infiltration plan.

To that extent, interrogations of Hamas prisoners and the seizure of other physical Hamas items which the IDF found while invading Gaza led to Hamas being able to build a model of portions of the base to practice its invasion, just like Israeli special forces sometimes do pre-operation.

This allowed Hamas to greatly improve its tactical planning for invading Nahal Oz, far beyond even the already significant analysis it had performed in the 2021-2022 Walls of Jericho plans, being able to time exactly how long it would take certain IDF reinforcements to arrive, and which soldiers would be stationed where in the early and secondary stages of the invasion.

Hamas knew where the base’s generators and video cameras were, where the safe rooms were, how and when the patrols moved around, where the base commander and the company commanders each slept, where the coordination situation room was and more.

A Hamas document stated that if they succeeded in quickly overwhelming the Nahal Oz base and forces at Yiftach, then the IDF’s capacity to mount an organized defense in the area would quickly fall apart.

Hamas overcame the soldiers at Nahal Oz in three waves, following having hit it with around 65 rockets between 6:30 a.m. and 7:05 a.m. The first wave around 6:30 a.m. had around 65 invaders, the second wave around 9:00 a.m. had around 50, and the third wave around 10:00 a.m. had around 100 for a total of around 215.

Israeli forces were initially distracted by the rocket attack with video footage showing them standing around very calmly in secure rooms, but taking almost no precautions to take up positions to protect themselves from a ground invasion.

By 6:45 a.m., Hamas invaders had rallied in significant numbers from multiple sides of the base in order to attack the base on two fronts simultaneously.

Many IDF soldiers only started to move toward defensive positions on the base’s wall at this time, leaving them at a disadvantage from Hamas already being ready for their arrival.

Also, the two-sided Hamas attack forced the Israeli forces inside the base to divide their defense.

The soldiers stationed at the base at the time of the invasion included a group from the 13th battalion of the Golani Brigade, two tanks, and a field collection unit from battalion 414.

In total, the IDF had around 162 soldiers in and around the Nahal Oz base, but only 81 of them were trained as combat fighters and, scandalously, only 90 had weapons.

This issue of having so many soldiers so close to the border with no weapons was one of the first which the IDF said it had made sure to change after the October 7 disaster started to be analyzed.

Next, the situation was even worse because only a few dozen fighters actually took up positions along the wall protecting the base, with most armed soldiers and all unarmed soldiers taking up predetermined positions within disparate partially secure buildings inside the base.

Although from one perspective, taking up these positions was following a certain procedure in the event of a small scale attempt to infiltrate the base, which was the main scenario of an anticipated invasion if any, it made no sense in light of the multiple sets of dozens of Hamas invaders getting ready to break through the base walls on multiple sides.

The tanks were not used effectively both because by the time they were being manned and operated, Hamas invaders had already started to penetrate the base, such that a chance for the tank’s maximal use of firing on the invaders before they arrived at the base had already been missed.

Also, one of the tank’s was outside the base and did not return in time to make a difference, while the tank inside the base did manage to kill a small number of Hamas invaders, but then followed standard procedure of taking up a position outside the base to thwart further invaders, not realizing how desperate the situation inside the base was about to become.

In a short period of time, Hamas used anti-tank missiles, grenades, and gunfire to kill the small pockets of resistance on the base walls and to break through into the base from multiple directions.

Timeline: How Hamas ravaged through Nahal Oz base

By 7:30 a.m., Hamas had also penetrated the main gate to the base.

The IDF divided the first stage of the battle into 6:29 a.m. to 8:20 a.m., the initial penetration and initial fighting in the base, which included around 35 different sub-fights, with around half a dozen more significant and longer fights.

Next, the IDF framed the 8:20 a.m. to 12:00 noon period as continuing the battle, including at 10:20 a.m. when Hamas took seven female lookouts and a three person tank crew as hostages.

The third stage was from 12:00 noon to 8:00 p.m. when Israeli forces steadily started to regain control and overpower the Hamas invaders.

More specifically, between 12:00 noon and 1:36 p.m., battalion 890 paratroopers and Tamam special combat police forces made their way in waves to reinforce the Nahal Oz base. Most of the invaders were killed or cleared out by 5:00 p.m.

One unique aspect of the Nahal Oz battle is that because lookouts were involved, the IDF probe into it shows that they knew exactly what the invaders were doing minute by minute in real time.

At 6:31 a.m., the female lookouts reported Hamas invaders were cutting through the fence across from the Nahal Oz base. Almost immediately after that they reported that a whole cell of invaders was streaming through.

The reigning commander on the base reported to all nearby positions and to the brigade command center that “a complex situation” was developing.

At 6:33 a.m., lookouts reported a whole being blown in another part of the border fence.

At 6:37 a.m., they made additional reports about breaks in the fence.

Then at 6:39 a.m., the lookouts reported that dozens of additional invaders were flowing into Israeli territory.

Around 6:38 a.m., the base failed to fire off its mortars at the invaders before they arrived close to the base walls, partially because one of the base commanders was off base and had taken portions of the communications gear.

This meant that it was not possible to fire the mortars in a timely fashion.

Next, the female lookouts reported that there were five separate breaks in the border fence.

Unfortunately, the brigade office did not pass on these reports to the division headquarters, IDF southern command, or IDF high command, and the situation was not clear at higher levels until much later.

The IDF probe found that multiple forces in the base and nearby the base retreated rather than confronting the invaders head-on.

However, the probe also found that many of the fighters inside the base fought valiantly, and that the female lookouts made spot-on reports despite the pressure they were under.

The IDF probe found that the situation room was built to resist rocket fire, but not a ground invasion, a glaring error given how close the base was to the border. Moreover, the IDF lookouts had been given no combat training or planning in the event of an invasion.

Most of the key IDF commanders on and around the base were killed during the battle.